Combinatorial Game Theory
who wins, and by how much
Concept

Criterion — where it appears

A stated condition meant to decide a question without solving it — whether regions add, whether a sequence settles, whether a strategy exists. What makes one worth having is that it can fail, and most of the work here is measuring where.

Named by 12 essays across 3 fields — each of them below, with the objects they name alongside it.

Thickness is not the variable; the wall's own groups are. The same strips split by whether the wall is all one colour. A wall of one colour is a single group with liberties on both sides and it never separates them, at any thickness. A wall of two colours is two groups breathing in opposite directions and it nearly always does.

How thick a wall has to be

A single stone between two empty stretches of a NoGo board couples them, and the obvious repair is a thicker wall. Over 590 walled strips a thicker wall does help — and splitting the same 590 by the colour of the stones shows that thickness was never the variable. A wall of four one colour couples the sides exactly as one stone does.

positions · Nogo A criterion that does not lift. The NoGo separation criterion run on strips and on three-row boards. On strips it holds on nine boards and explains all nine independent ones. On 227 three-row boards it holds on none at all.

A wall that bends

On a NoGo strip, two empty stretches add when no group breathes into both — a wall of two stones of different colours does it, and the criterion explains nine of ninety-three boards and all nine that it covers. On a three-row board it explains none of 227, and not because it is less accurate. A wall across a board has to bend, a stone at the bend sees empty squares on both sides by itself, and every one of the 227 has a group breathing into both regions. The condition is unsatisfiable.

positions · Nogo Three complete solutions, each asked about the others. Bouton's 1901 criterion for Nim, Wythoff's 1907 description of his own cold positions, Moore's 1910 rule for taking from several heaps, and the Grundy criterion that arrived thirty years later, each checked against the truth on every position of four games. Every one of the old criteria is exact about its own game and wrong about the others. The blanks matter more than the numbers: Wythoff's is a description of a pair and has no form for three heaps at all, and the Grundy criterion has no form for a game whose moves touch several heaps at once.

Three complete solutions in nine years

Bouton in 1901, Wythoff in 1907, Moore in 1910 — three airtight solutions of three games, all published before there was any theory of games at all. Asked about each other's games they all fail, and two of them fail by being wrong while one fails by having no form for the question. Only the last kind of failure decides anything.

history · Bouton How far a description of that kind could ever have gone. Subtraction games sorted by whether a Bouton-style column criterion describes their losing positions. His test reads the heap sizes in binary and counts the marks in each column, which works exactly when a heap's value is a function of its own bits — and that is true of a small minority of the family. Below it, the weaker readings: a criterion on the low bits, and a sequence that merely repeats. The method itself is available for every game and says nothing; what 1901 supplied was a set with a description shorter than the game.

A set with a short description

Bouton's argument is a closure argument about a set, and every impartial game has such a set — its own losing positions. So the method is complete and proves nothing. What made 1901 a theorem is that his set had a description shorter than the game, and swept over fifty-six subtraction games, exactly seven have one of his kind.

history · Bouton The misère sentence, asked of games it was not written for. Bouton's one-sentence solution of misère Nim put to four other impartial games and checked against a search on every position. It is exact on Nim, which is the game it is a theorem about, and wrong on all the others — and wrong in both directions, calling wins losses and losses wins, where the same paper's normal-play criterion errs only one way. The clause responsible is the one about heaps of size one, which is a statement about how many counters are left rather than about what a move can do with them.

The sentence that solved the other convention

Bouton's paper solves misère Nim too, in one line, and it is the only misère result in the subject that fits on one. Transplanted the way the normal criterion is, it fails differently — the normal one calls losses wins and never the reverse, and this one errs in both directions on every game tried, because the clause it adds is about counters rather than about moves.

history · Bouton A bridge circuit, with a link that is not there. The switching graph drawn as a bridge circuit, with an imaginary link from A to B dashed in gold. The graph alone does not split into two edge-disjoint spanning trees, so Short moving second loses; with the imaginary link it does, drawn in blue and red, so Short moving first wins. The green links are the links of the red tree that cross between the two halves the blue tree falls into without the imaginary link — the first moves the trees name.

The first move is a link that is not there

Lehman's criterion answers one question about a switching game — who wins when Short moves second. The other question has the same answer asked of a different graph: add one link from A to B, and Cut is forced to spend its first move deleting it. The trees of that larger graph then name Short's opening, and on every subgraph of seven graphs they name a winner.

applied · Switching The Bridg-It board of size 3, both players at once. A Bridg-It board of size 3: blue dots in 4 rows of 3, red dots in 3 rows of 4, interleaved. Every bridge blue can usefully build is drawn in blue and every bridge red can usefully build in red, and each blue bridge crosses exactly one red one. Blue's switching graph and its planar dual have the same numbers of points and links, because the dual is red's board turned a quarter.

Cut is Short on another graph

Everything proved about the switching game is proved from Short's side, and Cut appears only as the player whose moves get enumerated. On a graph drawn without crossings Cut does not need a theory of its own: deleting a link is securing the link that crosses it in the dual, so Cut's game is Short's game on a different graph. Bridg-It is the board that is its own dual — one link short of two trees at every size, which is why its first player wins.

applied · Switching A bridge circuit, with a point on every link. The switching graph drawn as a bridge circuit, with a new point in the middle of every link in green and the original inner points in blue, already belonging to Short. Played as a game on the green points it gives the same verdict as the original game on links, because claiming a middle point is securing its link and deleting it is deleting the link.

A point with three neighbours

The switching game on links is settled by counting — enough links, arranged as two trees. Played on points instead, it is the game Hex belongs to, and the count is gone. The link game turns out to be the point game in which every contested point has exactly two neighbours; give one a third, and two graphs with the same points, the same links and the same number of separate routes can have opposite winners.

applied · Switching The law, on a board rather than in a bag. The parity law applied to every position of a real board that has fallen into chains and loops, with the verdict computed independently from the board's own strings. The components are the ones the geometry produces rather than the ones a sweep constructs.

A thousand positions and no exception

The parity law was fitted to constructed bags of chains and loops inside a string budget. A board's positions are a different population — the sizes are what the geometry allows, the components come correlated, and a six-box board holds exactly one position that is a loop of six. Tested on all 1,032 of them and all 160 of the four-box board's, the law is right every time, against a verdict computed from the strings by a walk that has never heard of a component.

applied · Dots and Boxes The fee the geometry charges. The same endgames solved with the cost of declining changed. Two boxes on a chain and four on a loop are what a single cut and a pair of cuts complete; altering them changes the winner of a large share of positions, which is what says the law depends on them.

Two and four are not conventions

Declining costs two boxes on a chain and four on a loop, and those numbers are read off the geometry rather than chosen: one cut completes the last two boxes of a chain and two cuts complete the last four of a loop. Solved again with the fee changed, 418 endgames give a different winner on up to a third of themselves — so the endgame's law is a law about the fee as much as about the shapes, and the fee is not a free parameter.

applied · Dots and Boxes One substitution, thirty-four years. Bouton's criterion and the Sprague–Grundy theorem run side by side over a family of games. They differ in one quantity: the heap's size against the heap's Grundy value. The exclusive-or that combines them is the same operation in both, and it is the one Bouton published in 1901.

The step nobody took for thirty-four years

Bouton's criterion is that the heap sizes exclusive-or to nothing. The 1935 theorem is that the heap Grundy values do. The exclusive-or is the same operation in both and it is his, so the whole of the intervening thirty-four years is one substitution — and run over eight games and 672 positions, the substituted criterion is exact on every one while the original is exact on Nim and nowhere else.

history · Bouton Bouton's argument, indexed by a value. Bouton's two closure properties stated for every Grundy value rather than for nought alone: no move stays inside a value class, and every class above a value can reach it. Checked on each game and each value in range.

The picture Bouton's proof leaves behind

His argument is two closure properties of one set, and the Sprague–Grundy theorem is the same two sentences with nought replaced by a variable — checked here on five games and every value in range, with no move staying inside a class and no class failing to be reachable from above. What the argument also leaves behind is a picture in which the values descend, and that is false: 99 of 444 moves here raise a value, and none of them is in Nim.

history · Bouton

Named alongside it

The objects these essays reach for when they reach for this one.

Exhaustive searchCounterexampleBoutonGrundy valueInvariantDecompositionNim-sumSubtraction gameCertificateThe Shannon switching gameBoardClosed form

All concepts